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The revelation effect is an episodic memory  phe-
nomenon that has received considerable attention in 
recent years (see Hicks & Marsh, 1998, for review). 
One reason for the interest in this effect is its odd na-
ture. The revelation effect is demonstrated in retrieval 
tasks—most commonly recognition memory tests—
where participants are more likely to report that they 
recognized previously presented stimuli when they 
engage in some interpolated task before making their 
recognition judgments. For example, participants are 
shown a list of words during the study phase. At test, 
participants are shown both the study words (i.e., tar-
gets) and new words (i.e., lures) and asked to identify 
the words they recognized from the study list. How-
ever, during the recognition phase, half of the words 
are “revealed” in some fashion (e.g., by solving an 
anagram of the word to be recognized or completing 
a word fragment), with the result that participants re-
port recognizing the revealed words (both targets and 
lures) to a greater degree than words presented nor-
mally. Thus, the revelation effect demonstrates that 
retrieval conditions can be manipulated to infl uence 
people’s memory. Although most demonstrations of 
the revelation effect have employed recognition mem-
ory tests, it has also been obtained—again using ver-
bal stimuli—when participants are asked to make fre-
quency judgments (Bornstein & Neely, 2001; Wester-
man & Greene, 1996).
The revelation effect appears to be restricted to ep-
isodic memory judgments in young adults (Cameron 
& Hockley, 2000; Frigo, Reas, & LeCompte, 1999; 
Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990; Westerman, 2000). 
Revelation effects are not found in older adults (Prull, 
Light, Collett, & Kennison, 1998) or when partic-
ipants make semantic judgments, such as judging 
words based on their lexicality or category typicality 
(Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990), but it has otherwise 
proven to be quite robust. The empirical results of the 
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revelation effect prompted Westerman and Greene 
(1998) to comment that “Attempts to determine the 
boundary conditions of the revelation effect have, so 
far, succeeded mostly in demonstrating its generality” 
(p. 378). Thus, continuing to defi ne the boundaries or 
generality of the revelation effect is essential in terms 
of theory testing. 
A variety of interpolated tasks have been used to 
demonstrate the revelation effect. The most common 
tasks include having participants solve anagrams of 
the words before making recognition judgments (e.g., 
Frigo et al., 1999; Peynircioglu & Tekcan, 1993), 
gradually completing degraded words (Luo, 1993) or 
word fragments (e.g., LeCompte, 1995; Watkins & 
Peynircioglu, 1990), and rotating stimuli (e.g., Frigo 
et al., 1999; Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990). 
The revelation effect is not limited to words. Some 
research has also investigated the revelation effect 
with numbers. For example, participants have been 
given Roman numerals and asked to convert them 
to Arabic numerals before making recognition judg-
ments about whether they saw that number on the 
study list. Also, participants who received numbers 
at study have had to solve math problems at test and 
then decide whether their answer was on the study 
list. Revelation effects were found for both of these 
tasks (Watkins & Peynircioglu, 1990). These fi ndings 
are not surprising, as numbers are similar to words in 
the respect that they have ready, probably automatic, 
verbal designations. 
Only a single experiment has reported a revelation 
effect with pictorial stimuli. Luo (1993, Experiment 
2) presented pictures of ordinary objects and animals 
to participants at study, and again on a later recogni-
tion test. For half of the participants, the name of the 
picture was revealed prior to recognition by present-
ing it letter by letter until the word was completed. 
For example, a picture of a house would be presented 
at study; at test, the word H-O-U-S-E would gradually 
be presented, and then participants would make a rec-
ognition judgment regarding the picture of a house. 
Luo found that participants were more likely to say 
they recognized the picture if the name of the picture 
was fi rst revealed to them. Although this experiment 
demonstrated that a revelation effect could occur for 
non-verbal study items, two points should be noted. 
First, it is not clear whether a revelation effect would 
have occurred if the picture itself had been revealed in 
some fashion instead of the picture’s verbal label; sec-
ond, the procedure required using pictures that elicit-
ed easy and universal verbal encodings, making it am-
biguous to what extent the study stimuli were, in fact, 
encoded non-verbally in the fi rst place. 
One area in which the revelation effect has been 
largely unaddressed is recognition memory for faces.1 
Based on Luo’s (1993) research, it may be inviting to 
think that a revelation effect would also occur for fac-
es. However, it is not clear whether a revelation effect 
would occur in face recognition memory. Although 
some research suggests that facial and pictorial rec-
ognition differ from each other in terms of perceptu-
al processing (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998), 
there has also been research to suggest that face rec-
ognition memory is comparable to picture recognition 
memory, and that both face and picture recognition 
memory are different from verbal memory (Church & 
Winograd, 1986). 
Luo’s (1993) fi nding of a revelation effect with pic-
tures can be explained by assuming that pictures can 
be represented in a verbal system. In fact, Farah et al. 
(1998) recently concluded that face recognition and 
word recognition operate in two separate representa-
tional systems, where pictures can be processed with-
in either of the two systems. In contrast, faces are not 
easily verbalized (Farah et al., 1998). Therefore, Luo 
may have found a revelation effect when words were 
used as the interpolated task in picture recognition be-
cause the pictures were processed verbally. 
If a revelation effect occurs for faces, it demon-
strates the robustness of this phenomenon across epi-
sodic tasks and stimuli (i.e., words and faces) that are 
typically considered to be entirely unrelated in terms of 
cognitive processing (Farah et al., 1998) and recogni-
tion memory (Church & Winograd, 1986). On the other 
hand, if the revelation effect does not occur for faces, 
then a specifi c boundary condition has been identifi ed. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Inverted words have been used to demonstrate a 
revelation effect with verbal stimuli (e.g., Frigo et 
al., 1999). An analogous situation for determining 
whether a revelation effect can be achieved in face 
recognition memory is to show faces upside down. 
1 The only extant article we know of is in a Turkish journal that 
we were unable to obtain (see Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2001). 
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The present experiment adhered to common revela-
tion effect methodology, with the principal excep-
tion that faces were used as the study stimuli. A 2 × 
2 (targets vs lures; revealed vs intact) within-subject 
design was used. During the study phase, participants 
viewed a set of faces. At test, participants saw a sub-
set of the faces from the study list (targets) mixed 
in with new faces (lures), and they made judgments 
on whether they recognized the faces from the study 
list. For the “intact” condition, participants saw half 
of the faces (both targets and lures) presented nor-
mally and were then prompted with a command ask-
ing them if they recognized the face from the study 
list. For the rest of the faces (the “revealed” condi-
tion), participants made an attractiveness judgment 
about an upside-down face before it was inverted, 
whereupon they were prompted to make a recogni-
tion judgment on the face. Thus, participants made 
recognition judgments on both targets and lures, and 
when the faces were presented intact or revealed. 
Because face recognition is an episodic memo-
ry phenomenon and revelation effects have been ob-
tained in comparable episodic tasks using verbal stim-
uli, we hypothesized that a revelation effect would oc-
cur for faces. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 64 undergrad-
uates from psychology courses who received extra 
course credit. The pool of participants from which 
the sample was drawn was predominantly white, fe-
male, and in the 18–25-year-old age range. Partici-
pants’ race and gender were included as covariates in 
both experiments. As neither covariate accounted for 
a signifi cant amount of the explained variance, they 
are not discussed further. 
Materials. A large number of black-and-white pho-
tos of Caucasian female faces (N = 160) were collect-
ed from a high-school yearbook. The yearbook was 
from a time and place that ensured the faces would 
be unfamiliar to participants. These faces were trans-
ferred to slides and then pilot tested to eliminate dis-
tinctive faces, by asking participants to rate each face 
on a 7-point scale (1 = not distinctive, 7 = distinctive). 
Faces that received distinctiveness ratings signifi cant-
ly less than 4 (on the 7-point scale) were considered 
not to be distinctive. Of the original 160 faces, 140 
non-distinct faces were chosen for the present series 
of experiments, 100 of which were randomly selected 
to be used in the fi rst experiment. 
Design and procedure. A 2 × 2 (targets vs lures; re-
vealed vs intact) within-subject design was used. Dur-
ing the study phase, participants were shown 60 faces, 
presented by slide projector. The fi rst and last 10 faces 
from the study list were excluded from the test phase 
to reduce primacy and recency effects. Each face was 
displayed for 3 seconds. 
At test, participants saw 40 faces from the study list 
(targets) and 40 new faces (lures). Each face was seen 
for 4 seconds. Participants were asked to make (yes–
no) judgments on whether they recognized the faces 
from the study list. For half of the faces (both targets 
and lures), participants saw the faces presented nor-
mally and were then prompted with a command ask-
ing them if they recognized the face from the study 
list. The rest of the faces were presented upside down 
initially (for 2s), and then the same face was shown 
normally (2s). Although the degree of effort involved 
in the interpolated task does not predict the magnitude 
of the revelation effect (Luo, 1993; Peynircioglu & 
Tekcan, 1993), all revelation tasks require participants 
to perform some sort of judgment or manipulation on 
the stimulus, so that they give it some minimal level 
of attention (Hicks & Marsh, 1998). To ensure atten-
tion to the interpolated task, participants were asked 
to make attractiveness ratings (on a 10-point scale) for 
the faces when they were presented upside down. Par-
ticipants were told to wait until they saw the inverted 
face normally before making a recognition judgment. 
Thus, participants made recognition judgments on 
both targets and lures, and when the faces were pre-
sented intact or revealed. 
The faces were counterbalanced across conditions, 
so that faces revealed for one set of participants were 
intact for the other set of participants, and vice ver-
sa. The sequence of revealed and intact faces was de-
termined randomly, with the constraint that an equal 
number of targets and lures and revealed and intact 
items occurred in the fi rst 40 and the last 40 test trials. 
Participants were tested in groups of up to 10 people. 
The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes, and 
when participants fi nished they were debriefed and 
awarded their extra credit. 
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Results and discussion 
The revelation effect has been measured in differ-
ent ways by previous researchers. Most research on 
the revelation effect has compared the difference in 
the number of items called “old” by participants for 
the intact versus revealed conditions (e.g., Westerman 
& Greene, 1998). However, signal detection measures 
have also been used to examine the nature of the re-
sponses given by participants when exposed to in-
tact items compared to revealed items (e.g., Hicks & 
Marsh, 1998). For recognition memory, d’ is a mea-
sure of how well participants discriminate between 
targets and lures, and C is a measure of response bias. 
Signal detection measures such as d’ and C appear 
to offer some value in understanding the underlying 
causes of the revelation effect (Hicks & Marsh, 1998; 
Luo, 1993). For the sake of completeness, the data in 
the present research were analyzed both ways. 
Participants were signifi cantly more likely to re-
spond “yes” to targets than to lures, F(1, 63) = 141.2, 
p < ,001, MSe = 9.21 (see Table 1). Thus, participants 
were signifi cantly more likely to say they recognized 
faces that they had seen before compared to new fac-
es never seen. 
A signifi cant revelation effect was also found, F(1, 
63) = 5.32, p < .05, MSe = 6.35 (see Table 1): Re-
vealed faces were signifi cantly more likely to be called 
“old” than intact faces. This main effect of revelation 
condition extends the revelation effect to a new class 
of stimuli: faces. The revelation effect appears to be a 
highly robust phenomenon that is not limited to ver-
bal information. The target/lure × revelation interac-
tion was not signifi cant, F(1, 63) < 4.0, p > .05. 
Signal detection analyzes revealed that d’ was not 
signifi cantly different between intact (M = .61) and 
revealed items (M = .56); however, C was signifi cant-
ly greater for intact items (M = .17) than for revealed 
items (M = .06), t(63) = 2.53, p < .05. These analyz-
es indicate that the difference in performance between 
revealed and intact items does not refl ect a difference 
in discriminability between the two conditions; rather, 
participants applied a lower criterion for responding 
“old” to revealed items. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The revelation effect has also been demonstrated by 
making the revealed stimulus different from the stim-
ulus judged for recognition (Westerman & Greene, 
1996). For example, a positive response bias is found 
if the word raindrop is revealed and participants are 
asked if they recognized vineyard. Experiment 2 rep-
licates Experiment 1, while employing this variant of 
the interpolated task. Using the same manipulation as 
in Experiment 1 (i.e., stimulus inversion), Experiment 
2 revealed new faces that were different from the fac-
es that participants judged at test. Based on the results 
of Experiment 1, as well as analogous procedures us-
ing verbal stimuli (Bornstein & Neely, 2001; Wester-
man & Greene, 1996), we hypothesized a revelation 
effect for this procedure as well. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 52 undergrad-
uates from psychology courses who received extra 
course credit. 
Materials. The materials were identical to Exper-
iment 1 with the exception that 40 new faces were 
used in the revelation task. The 40 new faces were se-
lected from the pool of faces that had been normed in 
the pilot study for Experiment 1. 
Design and procedure. The 2 × 2 design and pro-
cedure were identical to Experiment 1, with the sole 
exception that the revealed face was different from 
the face participants were asked to make a recogni-
tion judgment about at test. Thus, the revealed faces 
were completely novel to the participants. On half of 
the test trials (“revelation” condition), a novel invert-
ed face (from the new set of faces) was displayed pri-
or to asking the participants whether they recognized 
the (different) test face. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants rated the inverted face for its attractiveness. On 
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the remaining test trials, the test faces were presented 
normally (“intact” condition). 
It should be noted that this procedure is not pre-
cisely analogous to the raindrop–vineyard proce-
dure used with verbal stimuli (see Bornstein & Neely, 
2001; Westerman & Greene, 1996). In that situation, 
participants have typically been required to solve the 
interpolated anagram before judging the (different) 
test item for recognition. Thus, they come to know the 
identity of the interpolated item. Here, participants do 
not “solve” the interpolated upside-down face before 
judging the (different) face for recognition. Because 
upside-down faces are processed relatively poorly, es-
pecially unfamiliar ones (Yin, 1969), participants may 
not “know” an interpolated upside-down face as well 
as they would an interpolated anagram, in the sense of 
forming an organized percept of it. Nonetheless, the 
procedure accomplishes the major goal of requiring 
participants to engage in an interpolated task involv-
ing a stimulus that is different from the test stimulus, 
yet drawn from the same class of stimuli. 
Results and discussion 
Participants were signifi cantly more likely to re-
spond “yes” to targets than to lures, F(1, 51) = 267.54, 
p < .001, MSe = 4.37 (see Table 2). Thus, participants 
were signifi cantly more likely to say they recognized 
faces that they had seen previously compared to faces 
never before seen. 
A signifi cant revelation effect was also found, F(1, 
51) = 4.98, p < .05, MSe = 4.08 (see Table 2). Re-
vealed faces were signifi cantly more likely to be 
called “old” than intact faces. Therefore, Experiment 
2 replicated the revelation effect found in Experiment 
1, and it also demonstrated that the interpolation of 
different faces can produce the revelation effect. This 
fi nding is analogous to the empirical fi ndings of the 
revelation effect for words (Westerman & Greene, 
1996). The target/lure x revelation interaction was not 
signifi cant, F(1, 51) < 4.0, p > .05. 
Signal detection analyzes revealed that d’ was not 
signifi cantly different between intact (M = .69) and 
revealed items (M = .60); however, C was signifi -
cantly greater for intact items (M = .31) than for re-
vealed items (M = .20), t(51) = 2.71, p < .01. These 
analyzes indicate that the difference in performance 
between revealed and intact items does not refl ect a 
difference in discriminability between the two con-
ditions, but a lower criterion for responding “old” to 
revealed items. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present experiments demonstrate that a reve-
lation effect occurs in face recognition memory. This 
fi nding is incorporated into the general frameworks of 
research on the revelation effect and face recognition 
memory, respectively. 
Implications for the revelation effect 
The revelation effect has been found with a variety 
of stimuli: words, numbers, pictures of concrete ob-
jects, and now faces. Nearly all previous demonstra-
tions of the revelation effect have used either verbal 
or easily (and perhaps automatically) verbalized stim-
uli, such as numbers and pictures of concrete objects 
(but see Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2001). The present 
fi ndings demonstrate a revelation effect with genuine-
ly non-verbal stimuli. Of course, faces do not com-
pletely lack verbal encodings (e.g., “big nose”), but 
unfamiliar faces will not have a single verbal designa-
tion that characterizes the whole stimulus, in the way 
that a numeral or picture of a concrete object would 
(Farah et al., 1998). 
As demonstrated in previous research (Hicks & 
Marsh, 1998), the revelation effect for faces was larg-
er for lures (i.e., false alarms) than for targets (i.e., 
hits; see Tables 1 and 2). Hicks and Marsh explain the 
stronger effect for lures in terms of a “decrement-to-
familiarity” interpretation of the revelation effect. Ac-
cording to their account, revelation produces a liber-
al shift in participants’ response criterion, and “more 
liberal shifts in the criterion increase false-alarm rates 
more than hit rates” (Hicks & Marsh, 1998, p.1118). 
EXTENDING THE REVELATION EFFECT TO FACES                                                                     145
The decrement-to-familiarity account is consistent 
with the present results. By activating competing al-
ternatives, revealing upside-down faces may increase 
the signal-to-noise ratio and thereby make test items 
seem less familiar. According to Hicks and Marsh, 
this increased task diffi culty would result in a more 
liberal response bias, and consequently more “old” re-
sponses to revealed than to intact faces. In support of 
this account, participants in both experiments adopted 
a more liberal response criterion for revealed than in-
tact items. 
The present fi ndings are also consistent with the 
other leading explanation of the revelation effect, 
Westerman and Greene’s (1998) Global Matching 
Model, which suggests that revealing items gener-
ates trace activation for the particular class of stim-
uli being revealed. If the test item and revealed item 
are from the same class of stimuli, this would produce 
an enhanced feeling of familiarity for the revealed 
test items compared to intact test items. The revela-
tion task used here—judging an inverted face for at-
tractiveness—could make the test stimulus seem more 
familiar than it would in the intact condition, there-
by supporting the Global Matching Model. One might 
expect the increase in familiarity to be greater in Ex-
periment 1 (which revealed the same face as the test 
item) than in Experiment 2 (which revealed a differ-
ent face), and indeed, the revelation effect was some-
what greater in Experiment 1 (4% vs 3%). However, 
it is impossible to know whether this small difference 
across experiments is meaningful, and given the diffi -
culty in recognizing upside-down faces (Yin, 1969), 
it might not matter whether or not the face judged for 
recognition was actually the same as the face shown 
as part of the interpolated task. 
Although the present fi ndings do not disambiguate 
between competing theories of the revelation effect, 
they nonetheless add to the accumulating literature 
demonstrating that it is a nearly ubiquitous phenome-
non. The revelation effect has already been found with 
a wide range of interpolated tasks using primarily ver-
bal stimuli. The present experiments demonstrated a 
revelation effect for faces when the interpolated task 
consisted of inverting upside-down faces. It should 
also be noted that the size of the effects obtained 
here was relatively modest (2–3% for targets, 4–5% 
for lures), compared to previous research (on aver-
age, 6.4% for targets, 9.9% for lures; Hicks & Marsh, 
1998). Revelation effects with non-verbal stimuli may 
ultimately prove to be smaller (albeit still signifi cant) 
than with verbal stimuli; but the validity of this con-
jecture awaits further research using non-verbal stim-
uli. Thus, the only real boundary conditions that exist 
for the revelation effect are that it appears (1) to be a 
retrieval phenomenon that is limited to episodic mem-
ory tasks based on stimulus familiarity (e.g., Cameron 
& Hockley, 2000; Westerman, 2000), and (2) not to 
occur in elderly participants (Prull et al., 1998). 
Implications for face recognition 
It is also important to consider how the present re-
sults fi t into the literature on face recognition mem-
ory. Some research suggests that face recognition 
memory does not differ from picture recognition 
memory, while face and picture recognition memo-
ry taken together are different from verbal memory 
(Church & Winograd, 1986). This dichotomy seems 
at odds with Luo’s (1993) fi nding of a revelation ef-
fect when words were revealed prior to pictorial rec-
ognition judgments. However, Luo’s (1993) fi nding 
of a revelation effect using words as the interpolat-
ed task in picture recognition can be explained by as-
suming that pictures—especially concrete ones of the 
type used by Luo—can also be represented in a ver-
bal system (Farah et al., 1998). Therefore, Luo’s rev-
elation effect may have been produced when words 
were used as the interpolated task in picture recogni-
tion because the pictures were processed verbally. In 
contrast, Farah et al. (1998) summarize a long list of 
research studies in support of the claim that faces are 
not processed verbally. However, the fi nding of a rev-
elation effect for faces when faces were used in the 
interpolated task suggests that face recognition mem-
ory is not immune to some of the same retrieval phe-
nomena that affect verbal stimuli. 
There are practical implications of procedures, such 
as revelation, that produce a response bias in face rec-
ognition memory. In eyewitness identifi cation situa-
tions, for example, it is common for people to look 
through pictures of criminal suspects, in the context 
of mugshot searches or photographic lineups. If wit-
nesses initially saw a face that was inverted or par-
tially covered, and then the face was shown normally, 
they might be more likely to say that they recognized 
the person, compared to just seeing the intact photo. 
Also, it is important to remember that the revelation 
effect occurs for lures and is, in fact, slightly stronger 
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for them than for targets (Hicks & Marsh, 1998; see 
Tables 1 and 2). Considerable anecdotal and empiri-
cal research has documented that false positive iden-
tifi cations are a signifi cant problem in eyewitness tes-
timony (Wells et al., 1998). Therefore, it is important 
to minimize conditions that may contribute to false 
positive identifi cations, such as “revealing” the line-
up stimuli. 
Conclusion 
The revelation effect literature has heretofore relied 
almost exclusively on verbal, or easily verbalized, 
stimuli. The present experiments demonstrated that a 
revelation effect can be produced with faces as stim-
uli. This extension of the revelation effect to non-ver-
bal stimuli suggests that it appears to hold new sur-
prises, and to raise more questions, as it continues to 
be studied. 
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published online 30 July 2003 
REFERENCES 
Bornstein, B.H., & Neely, C.B. (2001). The revelation effect 
in frequency judgment. Memory & Cognition, 29, 209-
213. 
Cameron, T.E., & Hockley, W.E. (2000). The revelation ef-
fect for item and associative recognition: Familiarity ver-
sus recollection. Memory & Cognition, 28, 176-183. 
Church, V., & Winograd, E. (1986). Face recognition is not 
unique: Evidence from individual differences. In H. Ellis, 
M. Jeeves, F. Newcombe, & A. Young (Eds.), Aspects of 
face processing (pp. 71-77). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Farah, M.J., Wilson, K.D., Drain, M., & Tanaka, J.N. (1998). 
What is “special” about face perception? Psychological 
Review, 105, 482-498. 
Frigo, L.C., Reas, D.L., & LeCompte, D.C. (1999). Revela-
tion without presentation: Counterfeit study list yields ro-
bust revelation effect. Memory & Cognition, 27, 339-343. 
Hicks, J.L., & Marsh, R.L. (1998). A decrement-to-familiari-
ty interpretation of the revelation effect from forced-choice 
tests of recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24, 1105-
1120. 
LeCompte, D.L. (1995). Recollective experience in the reve-
lation effect: Separating the contributions of revelation and 
familiarity. Memory & Cognition, 23, 324-334. 
Luo, C.R. (1993). Enhanced feelings of recognition: Effects 
of identifying and manipulating test items on recognition 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 19, 405-413. 
Peynircioglu, Z.F., & Tekcan, A.I. (1993). Revelation effect: 
Effort or priming does not create the sense of familiarity. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 19, 382-388. 
Prull, M.W., Light, L.L., Collett, M.E., & Kennison, R.F. 
(1998). Age-related differences in memory illusions: Rev-
elation effect. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 5, 
147-165. 
Tekcan, A.I., & Peynircioglu, Z.F. (2001). Revelation effect: 
Effects of test conditions on face recognition. Turk Psikolo-
ji Dergisi, 16, 57-70. 
Watkins, M.J., & Peynircioglu, Z.F. (1990). The revelation ef-
fect: When disguising test items induces recognition. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 16, 1012-1020. 
Wells, G.L., Small, M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R.S., Fulero, 
S.M., & Brimacombe, C.A.E. (1998). Eyewitness identifi -
cation procedures: Recommendations for lineups and pho-
tospreads. Law and Human Behavior, 22, 603-647. 
Westerman, D.L. (2000). Recollection-based recognition elim-
inates the revelation effect in memory. Memory & Cogni-
tion, 28, 167-175. 
Westerman, D.L., & Greene, R.L. (1996). On the generality of 
the revelation effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22, 1147-1153. 
Westerman, D.L., & Greene, R.L. (1998). The revelation that 
the revelation effect is not due to revelation. Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
24, 377-386. 
Yin, R.K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 81, 141-145.
